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Superior Episodic Memory Is Associated
With Interhemispheric Processing
Stephen D. Christman and Ruth E. Propper
University of Toledo
The dependence of episodic memories on interhemispheric processing was tested. In Exper-
iment 1, positive familial sinistrality (FS+; e.g., presence of left-handed relatives) was
associated with superior episodic memory and inferior implicit memory in comparison with
negative familial sinistrality (i.e., FS-). This reflected a greater degree of interhemispheric
interaction in FS+ participants, which was hypothesized as facilitating episodic memory. In
Experiment 2, the authors directly manipulated inter- versus intrahemispheric processing
using tests of episodic (recognition) and semantic (lexical decision) memory in which letter
strings were presented twice within trial blocks. Semantic memory was superior when the 2nd
presentation went to the same hemisphere as the 1st. Episodic memory, however, was
superior when the 2nd presentation of a stimulus went to the opposite hemisphere. Results
support an interhemispheric processing basis for episodic memories.
Relatively little research has been devoted to the possible
existence of differences in memory performance as a func-
tion of handedness and as a function of the patterns of
cerebral laterality that underlie handedness. However, there
are both empirical and theoretical reasons to suspect the
presence of systematic handedness differences in memory.
From an empirical perspective, the small number of studies
that have explicitly compared the recognition memory per-
formance of left- versus right-handers yields a suggestive
trend toward superiority of left-handers over right-handers.
For example, Hannay and Malone (1976) compared the
effects of familial left-handedness on recognition memory
for nonsense words and found a nominal advantage for
participants with familial left-handedness. Sherman, Kul-
havy, and Burns (1976) examined recognition memory for
concrete versus abstract words and found a nominal advan-
tage for left-handers in memory for abstract words (an
advantage for right-handers in memory for concrete words
appeared to be mediated by superior imagery skills among
right-handers). Deutsch (1978) reported superior recogni-
tion memory for musical pitch among left-handers, espe-
cially among left-handers with mixed hand preference. An-
nett (1992) examined memory for the Rey-Osterrieth Com-
plex Figure among seven different handedness subgroups.
A post hoc analysis, collapsing the seven groups into three
groups (strong left-handers, mixed-handers, and strong
right-handers) and collapsing across gender, revealed a
nominal advantage for mixed-handers. Nagae (1994) exam-
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ined recognition memory for line-drawing pictures and
found a nominal advantage for left-handers. Finally, Martin
and Jones (1998,1999a, 1999b; Jones & Martin, 1997) have
reported handedness differences in recognition memory for
the orientation of everyday of objects depicted on common
stimuli (e.g., memory for whether the Queen of England
faces left or right on British coins). However, it appears that
these handedness differences depend on the orientation of
the stimulus: Left-handers were better at remembering
right-facing heads, whereas right-handers were superior at
remembering left-facing heads. Thus, the differences be-
tween left- and right-handers likely reflected differences in
motor imagery rather than differences in recognition mem-
ory per se (Martin & Jones, 1999b).
It must be noted that few of the handedness differences
cited above were significant or explicitly addressed by the
authors. There was also considerable variability in how
handedness was measured (e.g., in terms of degree vs.
direction of handedness, in terms of personal vs. familial
handedness). Finally, these studies did not directly compare
different types of memory, notably the episodic-semantic
distinction first proposed by Tulving (1985, 1986). Tulving
and others have argued for the existence of multiple mem-
ory systems, with episodic memories corresponding to the
actual remembering of an event's occurrence and with se-
mantic memories corresponding to knowledge of an event
without any conscious recollection of the event's actual
occurrence. A potentially important limitation of the above
studies is that none have explicitly contrasted these different
types of memory. Nonetheless, there is at least tentative
evidence to suggest that handedness differences (and, in
particular, an advantage for left- or mixed-handers) may
exist in recognition (i.e., episodic) memory.
The presence of tentative empirical trends discussed
above is relatively uninformative in the absence of a theo-
retical framework within which to explain potential individ-
ual differences in memory. However, a number of studies
focusing on the neural bases of memory provide a potential
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candidate for such a framework. In essence, the hypotheses
developed in this study were that (a) tests of episodic
memory (i.e., recall and recognition), relative to tests of
nonepisodic memory (i.e., semantic and implicit memory),
would be specifically dependent on interhemispheric pro-
cessing and that (b) right-handers with familial left-hand-
edness would be superior, relative to right-handers without
familial left-handedness, at episodic memory tasks because
of the presumed greater degree of interhemispheric integra-
tion associated with familial (and personal) non-right-hand-
edness. Support for each of these hypotheses is presented in
turn.
Support for the hypothesis that episodic memory requires
interhemispheric integration, whereas semantic memories
are more unilaterally localized, comes from a review of
positron emission tomography studies by Tulving, Kapur,
Craik, Moscovitch, and Houle (1994). On the basis of their
review, Tulving et al. (1994) proposed a hemispheric en-
coding/retrieval asymmetry (HERA) model of verbal epi-
sodic memory wherein the left and right hemispheres (LH
and RH), particularly the prefrontal lobes, are differentially
involved in semantic and episodic memory encoding and
retrieval. Tulving et al. (1994) suggested that the left pre-
frontal cortex is responsible for both the encoding and
retrieval of semantic memories; conversely, they also sug-
gested that episodic encoding versus retrieval is associated
with the left versus right hemispheres, respectively. Thus,
semantic versus episodic memories appear to be associated
with intrahemispheric versus interhemispheric processing,
respectively, lending further support to the hypothesis that
episodic memory requires integration of the cerebral hemi-
spheres, whereas semantic memory does not.
In an exhaustive review of the imaging literature, cover-
ing 170 experimental contrasts (i.e., brain activity in an
experimental condition contrasted with brain activity in a
reference or control condition) during semantic and episodic
memory tasks, Cabeza and Nyberg (2000) concluded that
brain "activity during semantic memory tasks has been
almost always found in the left hemisphere but not in the
right" (p. 20). For word fragment and stem completion
measures of implicit memory, the picture is somewhat
mixed: Of six relevant contrasts, three showed primarily
right-lateralized activity, two showed bilateral activity, and
one showed left-lateralized activity. Finally, for episodic
encoding tasks using verbal materials, "prefrontal activa-
tions were always left lateralized" (p. 23), whereas "pre-
frontal activations during episodic retrieval are sometimes
bilateral, but they show a clear tendency for right-lateral-
ization" (p. 26).
Thus, there is some uncertainty about the exact localiza-
tion of episodic encoding versus retrieval. For example,
Tulving et al. (1994) reported LH encoding and RH re-
trieval, Halsband et al. (1998) reported LH encoding and
bilateral retrieval, and Opitz, Mecklinger, and Friederici
(2000) reported bilateral encoding and LH retrieval. In this
sense, the exact localization of encoding and retrieval pro-
cesses is not clear; the differences among studies may
reflect differences in stimulus presentation or imaging tech-
nologies. However, these studies are all consistent in sug-
gesting an interhemispheric basis for episodic memories, in
contrast with more consistently lateralized unihemispheric
bases for semantic and implicit memory.
Research with split-brain patients indirectly implicates
the role of interhemispheric integration, as mediated by the
corpus callosum, in episodic memory. Recently, a study
implicated the role of the corpus callosum and interhemi-
spheric transfer in episodic, relative to implicit, memory.
Cronin-Golomb, Gabrieli, and Keane (1996) examined ep-
isodic recognition and implicit word stem completion for
words presented inter- or intrahemispherically in individu-
als with complete section of all forebrain commissures.
Participants demonstrated within-hemisphere priming on
the stem completion task, indicating that implicit memory
can be accessed intrahemispherically; furthermore, this task
can also be performed interhemispherically, which suggests
that implicit memories can be shared between the hemi-
spheres via subcortical structures. Conversely, participants'
performance on an episodic recognition task was impaired
regardless of presentation condition, indicating that episodic
memory cannot be performed intra- or interhemispherically.
This implies that the callosal section disrupts the normal
interhemispheric circuitry underlying performance on epi-
sodic memory tasks. Although a same-hemisphere advan-
tage for lateralized stimuli presented during an episodic task
has been noted (Leiber, 1982), no studies have compared
the size of the same-hemisphere advantage between tasks
tapping episodic versus semantic memory.
In a review of memory processes in split-brain patients,
Zaidel (1995) presented evidence that is also consistent with
the current framework. Although Zaidel did not explicitly
deal with the episodic-semantic distinction, the examples of
everyday memory tasks (e.g., memory for current events,
appointments, placement of common articles, parked car
location) and laboratory memory tasks (e.g., paired associ-
ated learning, memory for story passages) for which split-
brain patients show impairment are generally consistent
with processes requiring episodic memory. Conversely,
Zaidel reported that memories for things such as historical
events, cooking recipes, and categorical knowledge, which
are all generally consistent with semantic memories, are
normal in split-brain patients. Thus, there seems to be a
general consensus that the memory deficits following sec-
tioning of the corpus callosum seem to disproportionately
involve episodic memory processes, suggesting a special
role of interhemispheric interaction in the encoding and
retrieval of episodic, but not semantic, memories.
Given tentative support for interhemispheric versus intra-
hemispheric bases for episodic versus semantic memories,
respectively, the hypothesized superiority of persons with
personal or familial left-handedness in episodic (e.g., rec-
ognition) memory is presumed to arise from the presence of
greater interhemispheric connectivity and interaction. For
example, it is fairly well established that left-handedness
and mixed-handedness are associated with a larger corpus
callosum area (Clarke & Zaidel, 1994; Habib et al., 1991;
Witelson, 1985, 1989). The precise implications of a larger
corpus callosum for interhemispheric interaction are not
clear; for example, it is possible that the callosal connec-
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tivity is primarily inhibitory, which could, in principle,
mean that larger callosa are associated with lesser inter-
hemispheric interaction. However, given researchers' cur-
rent inability to simply and directly map neural excitation
and inhibition onto functional excitation and inhibition, it is
just as likely that larger callosa are indeed associated with
greater interhemispheric interaction.
Regarding evidence for greater functional interhemi-
spheric integration among left-handers, the picture is some-
what mixed. For example, Hellige (1993) and Christman
(1995) both concluded that, although there is tentative evi-
dence for greater interhemispheric interaction or reduced
hemispheric asymmetry among both left-handers and per-
sons with left-handed relatives, the effects are not always
robust or reliable. However, Christman (1995, 2001) noted
that the majority of studies on handedness differences in
interhemispheric interaction have used bilateral visual field
presentation of two or more stimuli (in which separate
stimuli presented to each hemisphere need to be compared),
which he argued may not generalize to situations in which
unitary input is presented centrally (and, hence, is equally
available to both hemispheres).
That is, the nature of interhemispheric interaction (and
individual differences therein) may differ between (a) situ-
ations in which input is presented bilaterally and each
hemisphere processes its own separate stimulus and com-
pares the results of its processing with the other hemisphere
and (b) situations in which a single stimulus is presented
centrally and each hemisphere is free to process the stimulus
in its preferred manner. Thus, it is still an open question as
to whether persons with personal or familial left-handedness
exhibit greater interhemispheric interaction in the process-
ing of nonlateralized input.
Given our working hypotheses of (a) interhemispheric
processing of episodic, relative to semantic and implicit,
memories and (b) greater interhemispheric interaction being
associated with personal or familial left-handedness, it was
therefore hypothesized that (familial) left-handedness
would be associated with superior performance on episodic,
relative to nonepisodic, memory tests. In Experiment 1, we
indirectly manipulated inter- versus intrahemispheric pro-
cessing by comparing the performance on tests of episodic
versus implicit memory of participants with versus without
left-handed relatives in their immediate family. Because of
logistical difficulties in procuring large and equivalent num-
bers of right- and left-handed participants, we used familial
left-handedness as a potential marker for increased inter-
hemispheric interaction (e.g., Gorynia & Egenter, 2000;
McKeever, VanDeventer, & Suberi, 1973). In Experi-
ment 2, we examined the neural basis of episodic (i.e.,
recognition) versus semantic (i.e., lexical decision) memo-
ries by using repeated presentation of stimuli to the same
versus the opposite visual field (and, hence, hemisphere) as
a means of directly controlling intra- versus interhemi-
spheric processing.
A final note regarding terminology is necessary. In both
Experiments 1 and 2, we used recognition tasks as a mea-
sure of episodic (and explicit) memory. In Experiment 2, we
contrasted episodic recognition with lexical decision, a
commonly accepted measure of semantic memory. Con-
versely, in Experiment 1, we contrasted episodic recogni-
tion with a fragment completion task, which is commonly
accepted as a test of implicit, not semantic, memory. In this
sense, this study contrasted episodic-explicit memory with
nonepisodic-nonexplicit memory, with a primary emphasis
on the interhemispheric basis of episodic, relative to non-
episodic, memory.
Experiment 1
Because participants with left-handed relatives may have
more bilateral representation of cerebral functions, greater
interhemispheric interaction, and larger corpus callosa, and
because the corpus callosum has been implicated in episodic
memory (e.g., Cronin-Golomb et al., 1996), we hypothe-
sized that participants with positive familial sinistrality
(FS+) would perform better on a test of episodic memory
than would participants without familial sinistrality (FS —).
In addition, there is evidence that personal handedness may
be related to individual differences in episodic memory.
Christman and Ammann (1995) found that left-handers
reported fewer dissociative experiences than strong right-
handers did; in particular, factor analyses revealed that this
difference specifically arises from a lesser incidence of
amnesia-type dissociations in left-handers (e.g., driving
from point A to point B yet having no conscious recollec-
tion of the drive). To the extent that FS+ individuals
resemble left-handers, this result suggests that FS+ partic-
ipants may have a relative superiority in episodic memory,
presumably reflecting their pattern of greater interhemi-
spheric integration. Accordingly, in Experiment 1, we ex-
amined individual differences in episodic-explicit versus
implicit memory using central presentation of stimuli, al-
lowing us to examine the present hypothesis indirectly but
under ecologically valid conditions.
Method
Participants. Participants were 180 United States Air Force
recruits in their 32nd or 33rd day of basic training at Lackland Air
Force Base, San Antonio, Texas. All participants were high school
graduates, and all spoke English as their native language. There
were 78 female participants, 97 male participants, and 5 partici-
pants for whom the gender coding was lost. Handedness was
established by means of the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory
(Oldfield, 1971), with participants obtaining a score of 70 or above
considered right-handed. Participants' familial sinistrality was also
assessed; F+ was defined as the presence of at least one left-
hander in the immediate family. Participants were randomly as-
signed to one of three test conditions: (a) a semantic memory task
wherein participants were required to complete word fragments,
(b) an episodic task wherein participants were required to recog-
nize words as having been seen previously, or (c) an episodic task
wherein participants were required to recall previously seen words.
Materials. Stimuli consisted of 110 words taken from Tulving,
Schacter, and Stark (1982). Words ranged from seven to eight
letters in length and were low in frequency. The 110 words were
divided into two groups, with half of the words being shown to
participants during a study phase and half serving as distractors for
the recognition and word-fragment tasks. Study and distractor lists
were counterbalanced within tasks.
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During the study phase, 55 words were presented serially on a
computer screen, each for 5 s. The first and last five words were
considered filler words to control for position effects and were not
included as items on the recognition or word-fragment tests, or in
subsequent analyses. Words were always presented in the same
order within a list. During the test phase, participants were pre-
sented with a list of 90 word fragments (word-fragment test), a list
of 90 words (recognition test), or a blank piece of paper (recall
test). Word fragments were identical to those used by Tulving et al.
(1982). All words and word fragments were presented in upper-
case, 28-point Courier font.
Design and procedure. All instructions were presented on
either 480DX or Pentium computers equipped with 17-in (43-cm)
monitors. Proctors were available to aid participants if they had
difficulty with any instructions. As part of a larger test battery,
participants were tested in groups and seated at individual work-
stations in five experimental sessions. Other tests in the battery
included several psychomotor and cognitive tasks and four ques-
tionnaires. Results of these other tests will be reported elsewhere
and are not relevant to the present experiment.
During the study phase, participants were seated approxi-
mately 43 cm from a computer monitor on which words were
presented centrally for 5 s each. Participants were given general
instructions to study the words shown to them and were told that
they would later be tested on them. No explicit mention of the form
of testing was made, and participants were not required to respond
to any stimulus presentations. Following the study phase, all
participants completed a computerized version of the Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory. This took approximately 2-3 min and
served as a distractor.
Participants in the word-fragment group were then given a list
of 90 word fragments, half consisting of words they had studied
previously and half consisting of distractors. Participants were
asked to complete as many fragments as possible by filling in the
blanks with letters so that the fragments formed words. Partici-
pants in the recall group were given a blank piece of paper and
instructed to write down as many words from the study phase as
they could remember. Participants performing the recognition task
were presented with a list of 90 words, half of which they had
studied previously and were asked to circle those they recognized
as having been shown to them. All participants were told they
had 20 min to complete the task.
Results
The proportion of items correctly completed or recog-
nized on the word-stem task or the recognition task, respec-
tively, was not an accurate measure of participants' perfor-
mance. This was because it did not take into account a
baseline number of items completed by chance that had not
been previously presented or that had been falsely recog-
nized. Therefore, as recommended by Graf and Mandler
(1984), we used corrected scores as the dependent measure
in all tasks. For the recognition task and for the word-
fragment task, this was the number of items recognized or
completed that had been previously studied minus the num-
ber of items falsely recognized or completed that had not
been seen previously. For the recall task, we conducted
analysis on the number of words correctly recalled minus
the number of words falsely recalled. Preliminary analyses
yielded no significant main effects or interactions involving
sex of participant (all Fs < 1), so subsequent analyses
collapsed across this factor. We conducted a 3 X 2 analysis
of variance (ANOVA) on the between-subjects variables of
task (word-fragment, recognition, or recall) and familial
sinistrality (FS+ orFS-).
Results revealed a main effect of task, F(2, 174) =
216.55, p < .001, with the recognition task yielding the best
performance (« = 62, M = 29.44), followed by the word-
fragment task (n = 56, M = 10.38), followed by the recall
task (n = 62, M = 3.55). There was no main effect of
familial sinistrality (F < 1).
A Task X FS interaction, F(2, 174) = 2.95, p < .05,
revealed that FS- participants (n = 26, M = 12.46) out-
performed FS+ participants (n = 30, M = 8.30) in word-
fragment completion (p < .05). FS+ participants (n = 30,
M = 4.67) outperformed FS- participants in recall (n = 32,
M = 2.44, p < .01). Group performance was equivalent for
the recognition task (FS-: n = 33, M = 30.06; FS + :
n = 29, M = 28.83, p > .05; see Figure 1).
Discussion
The hypothesis that episodic-explicit memory involves
integration of processing between the cerebral hemispheres,
whereas implicit memory does not, was supported by the
finding that FS+ individuals, who were hypothesized to
exhibit greater interhemispheric interaction, performed bet-
ter on a recall task compared with FS— individuals, who
were hypothesized to exhibit greater hemispheric indepen-
dence. If implicit memory is a unilateral phenomenon, it is
possible that greater interhemispheric interaction, such as
that displayed by FS+ individuals, would be detrimental to
this type of memory. Future research could involve inves-
tigation of the conditions under which FS+ participants'
40
so-
20-
10-
Recall Recognition FragmentComptetJon
Task
Figure 1. Corrected accuracy scores as a function of task and
familial sinistrality (for recall, corrected accuracy equals number
of words correctly recalled minus the number of words falsely
recalled; for recognition and completion, corrected accuracy
equals number of items recognized or completed that had been
studied previously minus the number of items falsely recognized
or completed that had not been seen previously). FS- = no
left-handed relatives in immediate family; FS+ = at least one
left-handed relative in immediate family.
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performance on other implicit tasks suffers relative to the
performance of FS— individuals.
The lack of individual differences in performance of the
recognition task is somewhat puzzling, given the significant
differences obtained with the other test of episodic memory
(i.e., free recall). One possible explanation concerns the role
of "remember" versus "know" responses in episodic recog-
nition (e.g., Gardiner, 1988; Schacter, Verfaellie, & Anes,
1997). Remembering an item implies that participants have
an explicit, consciously accessible representation of the
stimulus in question. However, participants can know that
they have seen a stimulus previously (e.g., on the basis of
familiarity) but have no explicit, conscious representation of
it. Although both judgments reflect episodic memory, re-
member judgments appear to involve a more direct form of
conscious, episodic retrieval (e.g., Parkin & Russo, 1993)
and are more susceptible to deterioration with temporal
delays than are know judgments, in which resistance to
temporal decay is more reminiscent of that displayed by
semantic and implicit forms of memory (e.g., Gardiner &
Java, 1991). To the extent that remember judgments repre-
sent a more pure measure of consciously retrieved episodic
memories, it is possible that FS+ participants were biased
toward successful recognition performance based on re-
member judgments, whereas FS- participants were biased
toward know judgments. Although the present study cannot
resolve this question, it is interesting that Propper and
Christman (2001) found handedness differences in remem-
ber versus know judgments. Namely, in a test of recognition
memory accompanied by participants making remember
versus know judgments for recognized items, they found no
overall differences in recognition memory between strongly
right-handed and mixed-handed participants. However,
strong right-handers were significantly biased toward mak-
ing more know than remember judgments, whereas mixed-
handers exhibited significantly more remember than know
judgments. In this light, it is interesting that in the present
Experiment 1, the FS- participants displayed a marginally
significantly stronger degree of handedness than did the
FS+ participants, F(\, 173) = 3.62, p < .059.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants. Participants were 84 right-handed undergraduate
psychology students who received course credit for their partici-
pation. English was the native language for all participants. The
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory was used to determine partici-
pants' handedness, with participants obtaining a score of 70 or
above being considered right-handed; information concerning fa-
milial sinistrality was also collected and was defined as the pres-
ence (FS+) versus the absence (FS-) of at least one left-hander in
an individual's immediate family. Individuals were assigned to one
of two test conditions, with the result that 38 participants (23
FS — : 13 female, 10 male; 15 FS + : 8 female, 7 male) were tested
on the semantic task and 46 participants (25 FS—: 19 female, 6
male; 21 FS + : 17 female, 4 male) were tested on the episodic task.
Materials. Stimuli consisted of 72 words and 72 nonwords.
Words were taken from the norms of Toglia and Battig (1978) and
were all high in frequency, imagery content, concreteness, and
familiarity. Nonwords were constructed by substituting at least one
letter in a word with a new letter, with the result that the letter
string was meaningless in the English language. Nonwords were
pronounceable and consonant with the rules of English orthogra-
phy. Letter strings were five letters in length and were presented in
uppercase, 24-point Helvetica font. The first letter of stimuli pre-
sented to the right visual field (RVF) and the last letter of stimuli
presented to the left visual field (LVF) fell 2.0° to the right or left,
respectively, of a fixation marker.
Design and procedure. The 144 letter strings were divided
equally and randomly into one of four groups such that 18 words
and 18 nonwords were always presented (a) twice to the RVF, (b)
twice to the LVF, (c) first to the RVF and second to the LVF, or
(d) first to the LVF and second to the RVF. There were six blocks
of 56 trials, each block consisting of two filler items, three practice
stimuli (each presented twice), and 48 experimental trials, yielded
by the factorial combination of 4 Visual Field Conditions (i.e.,
RVF-RVF, LVF-LVF, RVF-LVF, LVF-RVF) X 2 Stimulus
Types (i.e., words vs. nonwords) X 6 Replications. Within each
visual field condition, two replications involved four intervening
items between first and second presentations of the stimulus, two
replications involved five intervening items, and two replications
involved six intervening items. The number of intervening items
was varied so that participants could not anticipate repetitions. The
range of numbers of intervening items was chosen to follow the
procedure used by Leiber (1982).
Occasional filler items were included in each block to provide
the proper spacing between stimulus repetitions. Filler and practice
stimuli consisted of an equal number of words and nonwords
meeting the criteria mentioned previously, and their presentation to
either the LVF or the RVF was counterbalanced across blocks of
trials. Particular letter strings did not appear in more than one
block of trials. Because stimuli were presented in the same order
between participants within a block of trials, three versions of
stimuli presentation order were constructed. Order of block pre-
sentation followed a quasi-Latin square design, with the stipulation
that all three versions of a block were never presented consecu-
tively. Words and their particular nonword counterparts never
appeared in the same block of trials.
Participants were tested individually, seated approximately 43
cm in front of a computer monitor on which letter strings were
presented for approximately 180 ms to either the RVF or the LVF.
The same stimuli were used for both the semantic and episodic
tasks. In the semantic task, participants were instructed to deter-
mine whether the letter strings formed words or nonwords (lexical
decision). In the episodic task, participants were asked to deter-
mine whether they had seen that letter string previously within a
block of trials (recognition).
Each trial was preceded by an auditory warning tone indicating
that the participant should focus on the fixation marker (a lower-
case x) centered on the computer screen. A letter string was flashed
to either the left or right of the fixation marker 800 ms after the
tone. Participants indicated whether they saw a letter string for the
first or second time (episodic task) or whether they saw a word or
nonword (semantic task) by pressing the appropriate key. Partic-
ipants were instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately as
possible and were informed that each letter string would appear
only in a single block of trials. Reaction time (RT) was measured
in ms and was recorded by MacLaboratory from the onset of the
stimulus to the participants' response. Errors were also recorded.
RTs and errors to filler and practice trials were not included in
subsequent analyses.
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Results
Because the central interest in the present experiment was
the effect of prior experience with a stimulus (i.e., memory
for a stimulus) and because the effects of such experience
were not evident until the original stimulus had been re-
peated, we chose to use a priming measure as the dependent
variable rather than the raw RT values. This allowed us to
focus on hemispheric differences in priming independently
from overall visual field differences in performing the lex-
ical decision and recognition memory tasks. We determined
amount of priming in the following manner: We subtracted
RTs to the presentation of second stimuli from RTs to the
presentation of first stimuli. We conducted RT analyses on
these transformed scores and included RTs in the analyses
only if the participant responded correctly on both the first
and second presentations of a stimulus. It must be noted
that, for the recognition task, the measure was not strictly
one of priming but was rather a measure of how quickly one
can recognize an item as old, relative to how quickly one
can recognize it as new on its first presentation. For sake of
expositional clarity, however, we refer to it as a priming
measure.
We conducted an initial six-way, mixed-factorial
ANOVA with two levels of each factor on both RT priming
scores and on errors; the factors were Task (semantic or
episodic) X Stimulus Type (word or nonword) X Visual
Field of First Presentation (left or right) X Visual Field of
Second Presentation (same or opposite visual field as first
presentation) X Familial Sinistrality (positive or nega-
tive) X Sex (male or female). These analyses indicated no
significant effects involving sex for the error data. The only
effect of sex for the RT data was an interaction between
familial sinistrality and sex, F(l, 76) = 6.95, p < .01. This
reflected the fact that among FS- participants, men (M =
113.2 ms) showed more priming than did women (M = 64.9
ms), whereas among FS+ participants, women (M = 85.5
ms) showed more priming than did men (M = 47.4 ms).
Because this effect did not involve or interact with the task
or visual field variables of central interest, further analyses
collapsed across the factor of sex.
Results revealed a main effect of task, F(l, 80) = 6.84,
p < .01, such that there was significantly greater priming on
the semantic task (M = 105.0 ms) compared with the
episodic task (M = 55.6 ms). We obtained an interaction
between stimulus type and task, F(l, 80) = 9.14, p < .003.
Analysis of simple effects revealed that priming of non-
words during the episodic task (M = 30.0 ms) was signif-
icantly less than priming under all other conditions (words
episodic task, M = 81.1 ms; nonwords semantic task, M =
114.5 ms; words semantic task, M = 95.5 ms, p < .05).
We obtained the predicted interaction between visual
field of second presentation and task, F(\, 80) = 5.05, p <
.03 (see Figure 2). The semantic task yielded greater prim-
ing when the repetition of stimuli was presented to the same
visual field (M = 114.5 ms) than when the repetition was
presented to the opposite visual field as the initial presen-
tation (M = 95.5 ms). Conversely, the episodic task yielded
greater priming when the repetition of stimuli was presented
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Figure 2. Magnitude of priming (first presentation RT minus
second presentation RT in ms) as a function of memory task
(episodic vs. semantic) and visual field of second presentation
(same as first vs. opposite of first). RT = reaction time.
to the opposite visual field as the initial presentation
(M = 60.2 ms) than when the repetition was presented to the
same visual field (M = 51.0 ms). However, the simple
effects involving within-task comparisons (i.e., same vs.
opposite visual field presentations for each task separately)
were not significant.
There was an interaction between stimulus type and vi-
sual field of first presentation, F(l, 80) = 4.92, p < .03.
Analysis of simple effects revealed that words presented
first to the LVF resulted in significantly more priming
(M = 98.3 ms) than did nonwords presented first to the LVF
(M = 65.4 ms, p < .05). Stimulus type did not affect
priming for stimuli presented initially to the RVF (word,
M = 77.5 ms; nonword, M = 73.6 ms). There was also an
interaction between visual field of first presentation and
visual field of second presentation, F(l, 80) = 5.93, p <
.02, with stimuli presented twice to the RVF (M = 87.7 ms)
resulting in more priming than stimuli presented first to the
RVF and then to the LVF (M = 63.4 ms). Stimuli presented
twice to the LVF (M = 75.5 ms) resulted in less priming
than stimuli presented first to the LVF and then to the RVF
(M = 88.3 ms), although analysis of simple effects yielded
no significant differences.
With regard to the between-subjects variable of familial
sinistrality, there was an interaction between participants'
familial sinistrality and visual field of second presentation,
F(l, 80) = 4.95, p < .03. FS- participants (n = 48)
demonstrated more priming, regardless of task, when stim-
uli were presented twice to the same hemisphere (M = 93.4
ms), compared with when stimuli were presented to oppo-
site hemispheres (M = 74.5 ms). FS+ participants (n = 36)
exhibited more priming when stimuli were presented first to
one visual field and then to the opposite (M =81.2 ms),
compared with when stimuli were presented to the same
hemisphere twice (M = 72.1 ms), although analysis of
simple effects yielded no significant differences (see Figure
EPISODIC MEMORY AND INTERHEMISPHERIC PROCESSING 613
3). All other main effects and interactions were nonsignif-
icant, with p values above .12.
We defined errors as incorrect responses to the second
presentation of a stimulus, given a correct response to the
first presentation (we excluded conditions in which incor-
rect responses were given to the first presentation from all
analyses). Results revealed a main effect of task, F ( l ,
80) = 31.31, p < .01, with more errors occurring during the
episodic task (M = 1.92) compared with the semantic task
(M = 0.79). In addition, there was a main effect of stimulus
type, F(l, 80) = 82.8, p < .01, with more errors occurring
in response to nonwords (M - 1.95) than to words
(M = 0.80).
We obtained an interaction between stimulus type and
task, F(l, 80) = 21.36, p < .01. Analysis of simple effects
revealed that the greatest number of errors occurred in
response to nonwords during the episodic task (M = 2.76),
and the fewest occurred in response to words during the
semantic task (M = 0.45), compared with other conditions
(semantic task nonwords, M = 1.13; episodic task words,
M = 1.08, p < .05). There was also an interaction between
visual field of first presentation and visual field of second
presentation, F(l, 80) = 4.77, p < .05, such that stimuli
presented twice to the RVF resulted in significantly fewer
errors (M = 1.17) than did stimuli presented first to the RVF
and then to the LVF (M = 1.52, p < .05; twice to the LVF,
M = 1.40; and first to the LVF field and then to the RVF,
M = 1.41).
We obtained a three-way interaction between stimulus
type, visual field of first presentation, and visual field of
second presentation, F(\, 80) = 9.06, p < .01. Analysis of
simple effects revealed significantly fewer errors in re-
sponse to nonwords presented twice to the RVF (M = 1.49)
compared with all other nonword presentation conditions
(nonwords twice to the LVF, M = 2.05; nonwords first to
the LVF and then to the RVF, M = 1.99; nonwords first to
the RVF and then to the LVF, M = 2.26, p < .05).
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Figure 3. Magnitude of priming (first presentation RT minus
second presentation RT in ms) as a function of familial sinistrality
(FS- = no left-handed relatives in immediate family; FS+ = at
least one left-handed relative in immediate family) and visual field
of second presentation (same as first vs. opposite of first). RT =
reaction time.
Post hoc analysis revealed an interaction between partic-
ipants' familial sinistrality and visual field of first presen-
tation, F(l, 84) = 6.40, p < .05. FS+ participants made the
most errors when stimuli were presented first to the RVF,
whereas FS- participants made the most errors in response
to stimuli presented first to the LVF; however, simple ef-
fects were not significant.
Discussion
The results support the hypothesis that episodic-explicit
memory is an interhemispheric phenomenon, whereas se-
mantic-implicit memory is more intrahemispheric in nature.
Although we predicted a same-hemisphere advantage for
both the implicit fragment completion and episodic recog-
nition tasks, results actually reveal an opposite-hemisphere
advantage for the task accessing episodic memory. This is a
rather counterintuitive finding. It would seem reasonable to
expect that presentation of a stimulus twice to the same
neural structure (i.e., cerebral hemisphere) would result in
greater priming than would presentation of a stimulus twice
but to different cerebral structures, regardless of task. The
finding of an opposite-hemisphere advantage for magnitude
of priming in the episodic task suggests that this type of
memory is critically reliant on interhemispheric integration
of processing.
With regard to Tulving et al.'s (1994) HERA model of
episodic encoding and retrieval, the results offer qualified
support for their theory. Although the general notion of
interhemispheric versus intrahemispheric processing in-
volved in episodic versus semantic memory, respectively, is
supported, specifics of the HERA model are not. According
to the model, episodic memory encoding and retrieval take
place in the left and right prefrontal cortex, respectively,
whereas the encoding and retrieval of semantic memories
occur in the left prefrontal cortex. It may have been ex-
pected that, for the episodic task, the greatest amount of
priming would occur when stimuli were presented first to
the RVF/left hemisphere and second to the LVF/right hemi-
sphere; however, we obtained the opposite-hemisphere ad-
vantage in the episodic task in equal magnitude regardless
of the visual field of first presentation. Similarly, it may
have been predicted that the greatest amount of priming for
the semantic task would have occurred for stimuli presented
twice to the RVF or left hemisphere. Indeed, this was the
case; participants performing the semantic task did demon-
strate the most priming when stimuli were presented twice
to the RVF or left hemisphere, although the effect was not
significant.
Although this discrepancy on the episodic task cannot be
resolved on the basis of the present results, a number of
methodological differences between the two studies may
play a role. First, the correspondence between physiological
data (as in the Tulving et al., 1994, study) and behavioral
data (as in the present study) is not always straightforward.
Second, the Tulving et al. article covered only studies using
central presentation of input, thus allowing the encoding
and retrieval systems considerable flexibility in determining
which cortical regions handled which aspects of the task.
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The use of lateralized presentation of input in the present
experiment, however, served to externally constrain which
hemisphere performed encoding versus which performed
retrieval. That is, if there is a choice (e.g., as with central
input projected to both hemispheres), then perhaps the left
versus right hemispheres assume control over episodic en-
coding versus retrieval, respectively. When input to be
encoded or retrieved is projected to a single hemisphere,
however, then perhaps that hemisphere assumes processing
control regardless of its preferred mode. If so, the present
results suggest that episodic memory is generally benefited
by between-hemisphere separation of encoding versus re-
trieval, independent of which hemisphere performs initial
encoding operations.
In addition to the predicted Task X Presentation Condi-
tion interaction, we also obtained an interaction between
participants' familial sinistrality and same-different presen-
tation condition. Across both tasks, FS+ versus FS— par-
ticipants demonstrated opposite- versus same-hemisphere
advantages, respectively, in magnitude of priming. It is
important, however, that familial sinistrality did not factor
into the Task X Visual Field of Second Presentation inter-
action, showing that both FS— and FS+ participants dem-
onstrated similar interhemispheric effects for episodic and
semantic memory.
The finding that FS+ participants tended to display an
opposite-hemisphere priming advantage may reflect a
greater propensity toward bilateral processing in right-
handed FS+ participants (e.g., Kee, Bathurst, & Hellige,
1983; McKeever, 1990, 1991; Varney & Benton, 1975;
Zurif & Bryden, 1969). In addition, other research has
indicated that personal, and presumably familial, left-hand-
edness is associated with a larger corpus callosum (Burke &
Yeo, 1994; Cowell, Allen, Kertesz, Zalatimo, & Denenberg,
1994; Habib et al., 1991; Kertesz, Polk, Howell, & Black,
1987), and it has been suggested that the relative size of this
brain structure influences the amount of information transfer
between the cerebral hemispheres, with a larger corpus
callosum possibly encouraging more interhemispheric
transfer of information (e.g., Christman, 1993, 1995, 2001;
Dimond & Beaumont, 1972; Honda, 1982; McKeever &
Hoff, 1983; Moscovitch & Smith, 1979; Potter & Graves,
1988; Verillo, 1983). To the extent that FS+ individuals
share characteristics with personal left-handers, then FS +
participants may also exhibit greater interhemispheric inte-
gration. Because the exact influence of familial sinistrality
on aspects of interhemispheric processing is still unclear,
conclusions regarding greater interhemispheric interaction
in FS+ participants must be considered speculative.
Furthermore, the superiority of FS+ participants on epi-
sodic memory tasks found in Experiment 1 was not obtained
in Experiment 2. Two possible explanations can be pro-
vided. First, Experiment 1 used central presentation of stim-
uli, whereas Experiment 2 involved lateralized presenta-
tions. Individual differences in interhemispheric interaction
may differ as a function of both hemispheres having equal
access to input (as in central presentation) versus hemi-
spheric access being directly determined by location of
input (as in lateralized presentation). Second, it is possible
that the effects in Experiment 1 were partially mediated by
marginally significant differences in strength of handedness
between FS— and FS+ participants. In contrast, there were
no differences in Experiment 2 in strength of handedness
between FS- and FS+ participants (F < 1).
General Discussion
The present experiments provide tentative behavioral
support for (a) the existence of individual differences in
memory performance as a function of task and familial
sinistrality and (b) the existence of between- versus within-
hemisphere processing advantages in episodic versus non-
episodic memory, respectively. In Experiment 1, within-
versus between-hemisphere processing was manipulated in-
directly by comparing the performance of FS+ versus FS-
participants, with the assumption that FS+ participants
would exhibit relatively greater degrees of interhemispheric
interaction, which in turn was hypothesized to selectively
benefit episodic memory. Results are consistent with our
framework, as FS+ versus FS- status was associated with
superior performance in episodic-explicit versus implicit
memory tasks, respectively. In Experiment 2, when within-
versus between-hemisphere processing was directly manip-
ulated by presenting subsequent input to either the same or
the opposite hemisphere as the initial presentation, superi-
ority in episodic versus semantic memory was associated
with between- versus within-hemisphere presentation of
input, respectively.
The results of Experiment 1 have important potential
implications for research into memory and cognition. The
presence of individual differences in episodic memory tasks
as a function of familial sinistrality suggests that studies of
individual differences in memory should pay attention to
familial (and probably personal) handedness. At the very
least, restriction of participant samples to strongly right-
handed FS- participants would provide for the most ho-
mogenous pool. At best, the presence of systematic individ-
ual differences in episodic memory could provide a useful
tool in developing formal models of memory processes
(e.g., taking into account systematic differences in inter-
hemispheric interaction). In a related vein, studies of am-
nesic syndromes may benefit from taking handedness into
account, as the greater interhemispheric interaction and
superior episodic memory displayed by FS+ individuals
could have systematic relations to both severity of amnesia
and anatomical locus of brain damage.
The results of Experiment 2 provide direct behavioral
evidence for an interhemispheric division of labor in epi-
sodic encoding and retrieval. Current models of the neural
bases of memory systems are not sufficiently advanced as to
provide an explanation for this effect. That is, it is not clear
why episodic memories benefit from an interhemispheric
division of labor, whereas semantic and implicit memories
benefit from unihemispheric processing. For example, the
HERA model is descriptive primarily when it comes to
interhemispheric issues. The focus of attention in testing
such models has been on intrahemispheric differences be-
tween memory systems (e.g., the role of lateral temporal
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areas in episodic encoding versus the role of medial-tem-
poral areas in semantic retrieval). An admittedly speculative
account for these findings involves the fact that episodic
memories have two components: (a) the memory event
itself and (b) the spatial and temporal context surrounding
that event. Given the fact that the left-lateralized implicit
memories involve retrieval of the event itself, in the absence
of explicit retrieval of the spatiotemporal context, it may be
the case that the specific events and stimuli are stored in the
left hemisphere, whereas the surrounding spatiotemporal
context is stored in the right hemisphere. Although this is
likely to be an overly simplistic notion, it does suggest
possible ways to test it. For example, the retrieval of the
spatiotemporal context surrounding an event, in the absence
of explicit memory for the event itself, is a fairly common
metacognitive failure (e.g., remembering that one had an
interesting thought earlier in the day while sitting at one's
desk but being unable to recall the thought itself). The
proposed account predicts that such metacognitive failures
would be associated with right-lateralized cortical activity.
The present findings also shed light on a potential neural
mechanism underlying childhood amnesia, the absence of
episodic memories for the first 3 or 4 years of life. Namely,
the offset of childhood amnesia (i.e., the onset of episodic
memory; Bruce, Dolan, & Philips-Grant, 2000; Eacott &
Crawley, 1999; Perner & Ruffman, 1995) roughly coincides
with the maturation and myelinization of the corpus callo-
sum (Giedd et al., 1996; Knyazeva & Farber, 1991; Witel-
son & Kigar, 1988; Yakovlev & Lecours, 1967). To the
extent that the present results suggest that interhemispheric
integration underlies episodic memories, a functional cor-
pus callosum should be critical in the formation of such
memories. Thus, perhaps the maturation of the corpus cal-
losum during early childhood is at least partly responsible
for the offset of childhood amnesia.
In conclusion, the present experiments provide initial
support for the hypothesis that the retrieval of episodic
memories is at least in part dependent on interhemispheric
interaction. Participants with greater degrees of interhemi-
spheric interaction displayed superior episodic memory
(Experiment 1), and presentation conditions that forced
interhemispheric interaction were associated with superior
episodic memory (Experiment 2). This hypothesis has re-
cently received further support with the finding that alter-
nating leftward-rightward eye movements, which activate
the right and left hemispheres in parallel (e.g., Bakan &
Svorad, 1969) and therefore presumably enhance interhemi-
spheric interaction, lead to improvements in episodic-
explicit, but not implicit, memory (Christman & Garvey,
2000).
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